“Again, we have to question now, what are we looking for, as far as capacity [and] sufficiency, there,” Cotton said, due to the evolving security situation, without specifying how many additional LRSOs he thinks should be acquired. He’s ready to “move out” with that program, he said.

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While Cotton was pleased with progress on the B-21 and LRSO, he said he is “a little worried” about the B-52J upgrade, which comprises new engines, navigation, radars and other improvements that will extend that bomber’s service life to 2050 or beyond.

“It is my LRSO carrier,” he said, “so I need to make sure the Air Force is paying attention to that—to the acquisition strategy—and gets the B-52J out on the ramp as soon as we can.” He did not explain why he is concerned about the upgrade’s progress, or why the Air Force might not be giving the program the attention it deserves. The program has experienced some delays and cost increases as it has transitioned from a fast-tracked prototyping program to a major acquisition program.

Chief of Space Operations Gen. Chance Saltzman told reporters Monday that given the executive [Iron Dome for America] order’s emphasis on space systems, it’s natural the service would play a key role in its development, adding that the service has established an integrated planning team, or IPT, to explore options in response to the order.

As for the nuclear deterrent, it has never been truly independent. That’s why generations of British politicians have insisted on always referring to it as such.
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The prime minister may have a notional right to “press the button”. But only the Americans can keep the system operational.
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Trident has been a symbol of the “specialness” of the relationship. But it sits on the foundation pillar of a Nato alliance that it is cracking. Someone needs to ask the awkward question. And in formulating an answer they should start with geography. European and British security are indivisible. They always have been.

The U.S. Navy awarded Lockheed Martin (NYSE: LMT) a $383 million cost-plus-incentive-fee and cost-plus-fixed-fee modification to the existing Lockheed Martin contract for development of the next generation of the Trident II Strategic Weapons System (SWS) D5 missile to continue the nation's sea-based strategic deterrence.

Under this contract modification, Lockheed Martin will design the upgraded missile, called the Trident II D5 Life Extension 2 (D5LE2). The integrated, modernized missile will be carried aboard COLUMBIA-class ballistic missile submarines to ensure the strategic weapon system remains credible through 2084.

"The second life extension of the Trident D5 missile will enable the United States and United Kingdom, through the Polaris Sales Agreement, to maintain credibility deterring evolving threats," said Jerry Mamrol, vice president of Fleet Ballistic Missiles at Lockheed Martin. "We are proud to continue our critical partnership with the U.S. Navy to take deterrence into this new era."

Dive-XL is conceived as a modular uncrewed undersea vehicle (UUV) that can be purchased by both government and commercial customers and outfitted with payloads to serve various missions, whether that’s inspecting offshore oil rigs for energy companies or helping potential military users hunt down enemy submarines. A few sections of the vehicle are standard no matter the customer, including a nose section packed with avionics and sensing equipment that allows for autonomous movement, a tail containing the drive propulsor and a mast on top with communications gear such as acoustic and radio frequency systems.

The middle portion of the vehicle, however, can be customized by the customer to house whatever payload they need, and can be configured either as a single extra-large container or up to three smaller ones.

The smallest version of the Dive-XL can be housed in a 40 foot shipping container, which allows for it to be transported on roads or via a C-17 cargo plane, Arnott said. From there, it can be made bigger by adding additional payload compartments that stretch the size of the vessel, which Arnott said can be bolted on in a matter of hours.

“Please note the Department of Defense has renamed this program from ‘Iron Dome for America’ to ‘Golden Dome for America,”

Ever since humankind first launched objects into space, counterspace capabilities (also known as “space weapons”) were developed to disrupt or destroy them. Now that space is increasingly being used for both civilian and military applications, space technologies have evolved to meet these needs, but regulations to protect space have lagged behind. This paper looks at how the international community is addressing the threats posed by these technologies through multilateral efforts and regulatory mechanisms to enhance space security.

Resiliency in orbit requires a vast infrastructure on the ground to monitor the space environment, launch satellites, and transmit data. But the United States is not alone in its dependence on overseas satellite ground sites and terrestrial space domain awareness sensors.

The alliance comprises three nuclear powers – namely, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. At that juncture, we suggested engaging in discourse with consideration of the collective capabilities of these three nations, whose geopolitical and practical targets ultimately encompass the territory of the Russian Federation. The United States, however, rejected this proposal, asserting that the United Kingdom and France independently make decisions and that the United States does not wish to meddle in their affairs. This reasoning appears rather absurd. Their objective seems to be the promotion – both for self-publicity and to influence public opinion – of the narrative of armament limitation between Russia and the United States, while excluding the arsenals of Paris and London, as well as conventional weapons issues, which are inextricably linked to strategic stability and in which NATO holds a significant advantage over us. These are integral components of the strategic stability we aspire to achieve. However, discussions should encompass all pertinent factors, including those I have mentioned, rather than cunningly advancing an attractive slogan that conceals a desire for unilateral benefit.

A couple of months ago, the United States accused us of intending to deploy nuclear arms in outer space and has successfully pushed through a United Nations Security Council resolution prohibiting such actions. We reminded them that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, to which all nuclear-armed nations are signatories, explicitly prohibits the placement of weapons of mass destruction in space, thus constituting a legal obligation. Upon the Americans' inexplicable reiteration of this obligation, we inquired about the status of conventional weapons and proposed the enhancement of the Outer Space Treaty with an initiative, championed by Russia and China, to establish a treaty preventing any arms race in outer space. The United States remains the sole nation obstructing this proposal. Their resolution to reaffirm the prohibition on nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in space implied a desire for the authorisation to station conventional arms therein. They oppose any ban on the militarisation of space. These are the type of partners we must contend with. We have been acquainted with them for a long time and have grown accustomed to such conduct.

Over the course of a two-day, unclassified workshop, the Mitchell Institute brought together 55 space subject matter experts with diverse backgrounds to examine how the United States, its allies, and partners can maintain an enduring spacepower advantage. The workshop findings reinforced that the U.S. Space Force’s current lines of effort are critical and must be expanded. This includes improving space domain awareness, space architecture resilience, and reforming security classification policies. Appropriately authorizing, organizing, training, and equipping America’s Guardians to deliver war-winning military effects in, from, and to space is the best way to secure an enduring peace.