Täglich ein Nietzsche-Zitat / A Nietzsche quote a day
06.04.202501:47
Ueble Eigenschaft des Mitleidens. — Das Mitleiden hat eine eigene Unverschämtheit als Gefährtin: denn weil es durchaus helfen möchte, ist es weder über die Mittel der Heilung, noch über Art und Ursache der Krankheit in Verlegenheit und quacksalbert muthig auf die Gesundheit und den Ruf seines Patienten los.
(Menschliches, Allzumenschliches II, „Vermischte Meinungen und Sprüche“, 68)
The Bad Characteristic of Sympathy. — Sympathy has a peculiar impudence for its companion. For, wishing to help at all costs, sympathy is in no perplexity either as to the means of assistance or as to the nature and cause of the disease, and goes on courageously administering all its quack medicines to restore the health and reputation of the patient.
[tr.: Paul V. Cohn]
(Menschliches, Allzumenschliches II, „Vermischte Meinungen und Sprüche“, 68)
The Bad Characteristic of Sympathy. — Sympathy has a peculiar impudence for its companion. For, wishing to help at all costs, sympathy is in no perplexity either as to the means of assistance or as to the nature and cause of the disease, and goes on courageously administering all its quack medicines to restore the health and reputation of the patient.
[tr.: Paul V. Cohn]
14.02.202501:43
Denn diess ist die Wahrheit: ausgezogen bin ich aus dem Hause der Gelehrten: und die Thür habe ich noch hinter mir zugeworfen.
Zu lange sass meine Seele hungrig an ihrem Tische; nicht, gleich ihnen, bin ich auf das Erkennen abgerichtet wie auf das Nüsseknacken.
[…]
Aber sie sitzen kühl in kühlem Schatten: sie wollen in Allem nur Zuschauer sein und hüten sich dort zu sitzen, wo die Sonne auf die Stufen brennt.
Gleich Solchen, die auf der Strasse stehn und die Leute angaffen, welche vorübergehn: also warten sie auch und gaffen Gedanken an, die Andre gedacht haben.
Greift man sie mit Händen, so stäuben sie um sich gleich Mehlsäcken, und unfreiwillig: aber wer erriethe wohl, dass ihr Staub vom Korne stammt und von der gelben Wonne der Sommerfelder?
Geben sie sich weise, so fröstelt mich ihrer kleinen Sprüche und Wahrheiten: ein Geruch ist oft an ihrer Weisheit, als ob sie aus dem Sumpfe stamme: und wahrlich, ich hörte auch schon den Frosch aus ihr quaken!
Geschickt sind sie, sie haben kluge Finger: was will meine Einfalt bei ihrer Vielfalt! Alles Fädeln und Knüpfen und Weben verstehn ihre Finger: also wirken sie die Strümpfe des Geistes!
Gute Uhrwerke sind sie: nur sorge man, sie richtig aufzuziehn! Dann zeigen sie ohne Falsch die Stunde an und machen einen bescheidnen Lärm dabei.
[…]
Ich sah sie immer mit Vorsicht Gift bereiten; und immer zogen sie gläserne Handschuhe dabei an ihre Finger.
Auch mit falschen Würfeln wissen sie zu spielen; und so eifrig fand ich sie spielen, dass sie dabei schwitzten.
Wir sind einander fremd, und ihre Tugenden gehn mir noch mehr wider den Geschmack, als ihre Falschheiten und falschen Würfel.
(Also sprach Zarathustra, „Von den Gelehrten“)
For this is the truth: I have departed from the house of the scholars, and the door have I also slammed behind me.
Too long did my soul sit hungry at their table: not like them have I got the knack of investigating, as the knack of nut-cracking.
[…]
But they sit cool in the cool shade: they want in everything to be merely spectators, and they avoid sitting where the sun burneth on the steps.
Like those who stand in the street and gape at the passers-by: thus do they also wait, and gape at the thoughts which others have thought.
Should one lay hold of them, then do they raise a dust like flour-sacks, and involuntarily: but who would divine that their dust came from corn, and from the yellow delight of the summer fields?
When they give themselves out as wise, then do their petty sayings and truths chill me: in their wisdom there is often an odour as if it came from the swamp; and verily, I have even heard the frog croak in it!
Clever are they--they have dexterous fingers: what doth MY simplicity pretend to beside their multiplicity! All threading and knitting and weaving do their fingers understand: thus do they make the hose of the spirit!
Good clockworks are they: only be careful to wind them up properly! Then do they indicate the hour without mistake, and make a modest noise thereby.
[…]
I saw them always prepare their poison with precaution; and always did they put glass gloves on their fingers in doing so.
They also know how to play with false dice; and so eagerly did I find them playing, that they perspired thereby.
We are alien to each other, and their virtues are even more repugnant to my taste than their falsehoods and false dice.
[tr.: Thomas Common]
Zu lange sass meine Seele hungrig an ihrem Tische; nicht, gleich ihnen, bin ich auf das Erkennen abgerichtet wie auf das Nüsseknacken.
[…]
Aber sie sitzen kühl in kühlem Schatten: sie wollen in Allem nur Zuschauer sein und hüten sich dort zu sitzen, wo die Sonne auf die Stufen brennt.
Gleich Solchen, die auf der Strasse stehn und die Leute angaffen, welche vorübergehn: also warten sie auch und gaffen Gedanken an, die Andre gedacht haben.
Greift man sie mit Händen, so stäuben sie um sich gleich Mehlsäcken, und unfreiwillig: aber wer erriethe wohl, dass ihr Staub vom Korne stammt und von der gelben Wonne der Sommerfelder?
Geben sie sich weise, so fröstelt mich ihrer kleinen Sprüche und Wahrheiten: ein Geruch ist oft an ihrer Weisheit, als ob sie aus dem Sumpfe stamme: und wahrlich, ich hörte auch schon den Frosch aus ihr quaken!
Geschickt sind sie, sie haben kluge Finger: was will meine Einfalt bei ihrer Vielfalt! Alles Fädeln und Knüpfen und Weben verstehn ihre Finger: also wirken sie die Strümpfe des Geistes!
Gute Uhrwerke sind sie: nur sorge man, sie richtig aufzuziehn! Dann zeigen sie ohne Falsch die Stunde an und machen einen bescheidnen Lärm dabei.
[…]
Ich sah sie immer mit Vorsicht Gift bereiten; und immer zogen sie gläserne Handschuhe dabei an ihre Finger.
Auch mit falschen Würfeln wissen sie zu spielen; und so eifrig fand ich sie spielen, dass sie dabei schwitzten.
Wir sind einander fremd, und ihre Tugenden gehn mir noch mehr wider den Geschmack, als ihre Falschheiten und falschen Würfel.
(Also sprach Zarathustra, „Von den Gelehrten“)
For this is the truth: I have departed from the house of the scholars, and the door have I also slammed behind me.
Too long did my soul sit hungry at their table: not like them have I got the knack of investigating, as the knack of nut-cracking.
[…]
But they sit cool in the cool shade: they want in everything to be merely spectators, and they avoid sitting where the sun burneth on the steps.
Like those who stand in the street and gape at the passers-by: thus do they also wait, and gape at the thoughts which others have thought.
Should one lay hold of them, then do they raise a dust like flour-sacks, and involuntarily: but who would divine that their dust came from corn, and from the yellow delight of the summer fields?
When they give themselves out as wise, then do their petty sayings and truths chill me: in their wisdom there is often an odour as if it came from the swamp; and verily, I have even heard the frog croak in it!
Clever are they--they have dexterous fingers: what doth MY simplicity pretend to beside their multiplicity! All threading and knitting and weaving do their fingers understand: thus do they make the hose of the spirit!
Good clockworks are they: only be careful to wind them up properly! Then do they indicate the hour without mistake, and make a modest noise thereby.
[…]
I saw them always prepare their poison with precaution; and always did they put glass gloves on their fingers in doing so.
They also know how to play with false dice; and so eagerly did I find them playing, that they perspired thereby.
We are alien to each other, and their virtues are even more repugnant to my taste than their falsehoods and false dice.
[tr.: Thomas Common]
10.02.202501:42
Wessen sind wir fähig? — Einer war durch seinen ungerathenen und boshaften Sohn den ganzen Tag so gequält worden, dass er ihn Abends erschlug und aufathmend zur übrigen Familie sagte: „So! nun können wir ruhig schlafen!“ — Was wissen wir, wozu uns Umstände treiben könnten!
(Morgenröte, 336)
What are we capable of? —A man who had been tormented all day by his spoilt and mischievous son slew him in the evening, and then with a sigh of relief said to the other members of his family: “Well now we can sleep in peace.” Who knows what circumstances might drive us to!
[tr.: John McFarland Kennedy; edited]
(Morgenröte, 336)
What are we capable of? —A man who had been tormented all day by his spoilt and mischievous son slew him in the evening, and then with a sigh of relief said to the other members of his family: “Well now we can sleep in peace.” Who knows what circumstances might drive us to!
[tr.: John McFarland Kennedy; edited]
01.11.202401:44
Morality for physicians. — The sick man is a parasite of society. In a certain state it is indecent to live longer. To go on vegetating in cowardly dependence on physicians and machinations, after the meaning of life, the right to life, has been lost, that ought to prompt a profound contempt in society. The physicians, in turn, would have to be the mediators of this contempt — not prescriptions, but every day a new dose of nausea with their patients. To create a new responsibility, that of the physician, for all cases in which the highest interest of life, of ascending life, demands the most inconsiderate pushing down and aside of degenerating life — for example, for the right of procreation, for the right to be born, for the right to live.
To die proudly when it is no longer possible to live proudly. Death freely chosen, death at the right time, brightly and cheerfully accomplished amid children and witnesses: then a real farewell is still possible, as the one who is taking leave is still there; also a real estimate of what one has achieved and what one has wished, drawing the sum of one's life — all in opposition to the wretched and revolting comedy that Christianity has made of the hour of death. One should never forget that Christianity has exploited the weakness of the dying for a rape of the conscience; and the manner of death itself, for value judgments about man and the past.
Here it is important to defy all the cowardices of prejudice and to establish, above all, the real, that is, the physiological, appreciation of so-called natural death — which is in the end also "unnatural," a kind of suicide. One never perishes through anybody but oneself. But usually it is death under the most contemptible conditions, an unfree death, death not at the right time, a coward's death. From love of life, one should desire a different death: free, conscious, without accident, without ambush.
Finally, some advice for our dear pessimists and other decadents. It is not in our hands to prevent our birth; but we can correct this mistake — for in some cases it is a mistake. When one does away with oneself, one does the most estimable thing possible: one almost earns the right to live. Society — what am I saying? — life itself derives more advantage from this than from any "life" of renunciation, anemia, and other virtues: one has liberated the others from one's sight; one has liberated life from an objection. Pessimism is proved only by the self-refutation of our dear pessimists: one must advance a step further in its logic and not only negate life with "will and representation," as Schopenhauer did — one must first of all negate Schopenhauer.
Incidentally, however contagious pessimism is, it still does not increase the sickliness of an age, of a generation as a whole: it is an expression of this sickliness. One falls victim to it as one falls victim to cholera: one has to be morbid enough in one's whole predisposition. Pessimism itself does not create a single decadent more; I recall the statistics which show that the years in which cholera rages do not differ from other years in the total number of deaths.
[tr.: W. Kaufmann, RJ Hollingdale]
To die proudly when it is no longer possible to live proudly. Death freely chosen, death at the right time, brightly and cheerfully accomplished amid children and witnesses: then a real farewell is still possible, as the one who is taking leave is still there; also a real estimate of what one has achieved and what one has wished, drawing the sum of one's life — all in opposition to the wretched and revolting comedy that Christianity has made of the hour of death. One should never forget that Christianity has exploited the weakness of the dying for a rape of the conscience; and the manner of death itself, for value judgments about man and the past.
Here it is important to defy all the cowardices of prejudice and to establish, above all, the real, that is, the physiological, appreciation of so-called natural death — which is in the end also "unnatural," a kind of suicide. One never perishes through anybody but oneself. But usually it is death under the most contemptible conditions, an unfree death, death not at the right time, a coward's death. From love of life, one should desire a different death: free, conscious, without accident, without ambush.
Finally, some advice for our dear pessimists and other decadents. It is not in our hands to prevent our birth; but we can correct this mistake — for in some cases it is a mistake. When one does away with oneself, one does the most estimable thing possible: one almost earns the right to live. Society — what am I saying? — life itself derives more advantage from this than from any "life" of renunciation, anemia, and other virtues: one has liberated the others from one's sight; one has liberated life from an objection. Pessimism is proved only by the self-refutation of our dear pessimists: one must advance a step further in its logic and not only negate life with "will and representation," as Schopenhauer did — one must first of all negate Schopenhauer.
Incidentally, however contagious pessimism is, it still does not increase the sickliness of an age, of a generation as a whole: it is an expression of this sickliness. One falls victim to it as one falls victim to cholera: one has to be morbid enough in one's whole predisposition. Pessimism itself does not create a single decadent more; I recall the statistics which show that the years in which cholera rages do not differ from other years in the total number of deaths.
[tr.: W. Kaufmann, RJ Hollingdale]
03.04.202501:47
Die Vertheidigung moralisch schwieriger als der Angriff. — Das wahre Helden- und Meisterstück des guten Menschen liegt nicht darin, dass er die Sache angreift und die Person fortfährt zu lieben, sondern in dem viel schwereren, seine eigene Sache zu vertheidigen, ohne dass man der angreifenden Person bitteres Herzeleid mache und machen wolle. Das Schwert des Angriffs ist ehrlich und breit, das der Vertheidigung läuft gewöhnlich in eine Nadel aus.
(Menschliches, Allzumenschliches II, „Vermischte Meinungen und Sprüche“, 55)
Defence Morally more Difficult than Attack. — The true heroic deed and masterpiece of the good man does not lie in attacking opinions and continuing to love their propounders, but in the far harder task of defending his own position without causing or intending to cause bitter heartburns to his opponent. The sword of attack is honest and broad, the sword of defence usually runs out to a needle point.
[tr.: Paul V. Cohn]
(Menschliches, Allzumenschliches II, „Vermischte Meinungen und Sprüche“, 55)
Defence Morally more Difficult than Attack. — The true heroic deed and masterpiece of the good man does not lie in attacking opinions and continuing to love their propounders, but in the far harder task of defending his own position without causing or intending to cause bitter heartburns to his opponent. The sword of attack is honest and broad, the sword of defence usually runs out to a needle point.
[tr.: Paul V. Cohn]
13.02.202501:43
Nicht zu verwechseln! — Ja! Er betrachtet die Sache von allen Seiten, und ihr meint, das sei ein rechter Mann der Erkenntniss. Aber er will nur den Preis herabsetzen, — er will sie kaufen!
(Morgenröte, 342)
Do not be deceived! —Yes, he examined the matter from every side and you think him to be a man of profound knowledge. But he only wishes to lower the price—he wants to buy it!
[tr.: John McFarland Kennedy]
(Morgenröte, 342)
Do not be deceived! —Yes, he examined the matter from every side and you think him to be a man of profound knowledge. But he only wishes to lower the price—he wants to buy it!
[tr.: John McFarland Kennedy]
09.02.202501:43
Damit Liebe als Liebe gespürt werde. — Wir haben nöthig, gegen uns redlich zu sein und uns sehr gut zu kennen, um gegen Andere jene menschenfreundliche Verstellung üben zu können, welche Liebe und Güte genannt wird.
(Morgenröte, 335)
That Love may be felt as Love. —We must be honest towards ourselves, and must know ourselves very well indeed, to be able to practise upon others that humane dissimulation known as love and kindness.
[tr.: John McFarland Kennedy]
(Morgenröte, 335)
That Love may be felt as Love. —We must be honest towards ourselves, and must know ourselves very well indeed, to be able to practise upon others that humane dissimulation known as love and kindness.
[tr.: John McFarland Kennedy]
31.10.202401:44
Kritik der Décadence-Moral. — Eine „altruistische“ Moral, eine Moral, bei der die Selbstsucht verkümmert —, bleibt unter allen Umständen ein schlechtes Anzeichen. Dies gilt vom Einzelnen, dies gilt namentlich von Völkern. Es fehlt am Besten, wenn es an der Selbstsucht zu fehlen beginnt. Instinktiv das Sich-Schädliche wählen, Gelockt-werden durch „uninteressirte“ Motive giebt beinahe die Formel ab für décadence. „Nicht seinen Nutzen suchen“ — das ist bloss das moralische Feigenblatt für eine ganz andere, nämlich physiologische Thatsächlichkeit: „ich weiss meinen Nutzen nicht mehr zu finden“… Disgregation der Instinkte! — Es ist zu Ende mit ihm, wenn der Mensch altruistisch wird. — Statt naiv zu sagen, „ ich bin nichts mehr werth“, sagt die Moral-Lüge im Munde des décadent: „Nichts ist etwas werth, — das Leben ist nichts werth“… Ein solches Urtheil bleibt zuletzt eine grosse Gefahr, es wirkt ansteckend, — auf dem ganzen morbiden Boden der Gesellschaft wuchert es bald zu tropischer Begriffs-Vegetation empor, bald als Religion (Christenthum), bald als Philosophie (Schopenhauerei). Unter Umständen vergiftet eine solche aus Fäulniss gewachsene Giftbaum-Vegetation mit ihrem Dunste weithin, auf Jahrtausende hin das Leben…
(Götzen-Dämmerung, „Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemässen“, 35)
Critique of the morality of decadence. — An "altruistic" morality — a morality in which self-interest wilts away — remains a bad sign under all circumstances. This is true of individuals; it is particularly true of nations. The best is lacking when self-interest begins to be lacking. Instinctively to choose what is harmful for oneself, to feel attracted by "disinterested" motives, that is virtually the formula of decadence. "Not to seek one's own advantage" — that is merely the moral fig leaf for quite a different, namely, a physiological, state of affairs: "I no longer know how to find my own advantage." Disintegration of the instincts! Man is finished when he becomes altruistic. Instead of saying naively, "I am no longer worth anything," the moral lie in the mouth of the decadent says, "Nothing is worth anything, life is not worth anything." Such a judgment always remains very dangerous, it is contagious: throughout the morbid soil of society it soon proliferates into a tropical vegetation of concepts — now as a religion (Christianity), now as a philosophy (Schopenhauerism). Sometimes the poisonous vegetation which has grown out of such decomposition poisons life itself for millennia with its fumes.
[tr.: W. Kaufmann, RJ Hollingdale]
(Götzen-Dämmerung, „Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemässen“, 35)
Critique of the morality of decadence. — An "altruistic" morality — a morality in which self-interest wilts away — remains a bad sign under all circumstances. This is true of individuals; it is particularly true of nations. The best is lacking when self-interest begins to be lacking. Instinctively to choose what is harmful for oneself, to feel attracted by "disinterested" motives, that is virtually the formula of decadence. "Not to seek one's own advantage" — that is merely the moral fig leaf for quite a different, namely, a physiological, state of affairs: "I no longer know how to find my own advantage." Disintegration of the instincts! Man is finished when he becomes altruistic. Instead of saying naively, "I am no longer worth anything," the moral lie in the mouth of the decadent says, "Nothing is worth anything, life is not worth anything." Such a judgment always remains very dangerous, it is contagious: throughout the morbid soil of society it soon proliferates into a tropical vegetation of concepts — now as a religion (Christianity), now as a philosophy (Schopenhauerism). Sometimes the poisonous vegetation which has grown out of such decomposition poisons life itself for millennia with its fumes.
[tr.: W. Kaufmann, RJ Hollingdale]
16.02.202501:43
Feinheit im Fehlgreifen. — Wenn Homer, wie man sagt, bisweilen geschlafen hat, so war er klüger als alle die Künstler des schlaflosen Ehrgeizes. Man muss die Bewunderer zu Athem kommen lassen, dadurch dass man sie von Zeit zu Zeit in Tadler verwandelt; denn Niemand hält eine ununterbrochen glänzende und wache Güte aus; und statt wohlzuthun, wird ein Meister der Art zum Zuchtmeister, den man hasst, während er vor uns hergeht.
(Morgenröte, 344)
Subtlety in Mistakes. —If Homer, as they say, sometimes nodded, he was wiser than all the artists of sleepless ambition. We must allow admirers to stop for a time and take breath by letting them find fault now and then; for nobody can bear an uninterruptedly brilliant and untiring excellence—and instead of doing good such a master would merely become a taskmaster, whom we hate while he precedes us.
[tr.: John McFarland Kennedy]
(Morgenröte, 344)
Subtlety in Mistakes. —If Homer, as they say, sometimes nodded, he was wiser than all the artists of sleepless ambition. We must allow admirers to stop for a time and take breath by letting them find fault now and then; for nobody can bear an uninterruptedly brilliant and untiring excellence—and instead of doing good such a master would merely become a taskmaster, whom we hate while he precedes us.
[tr.: John McFarland Kennedy]
12.02.202501:42
Der Augenschein ist gegen den Historiker. — Es ist eine gut bewiesene Sache, dass die Menschen aus dem Mutterleibe hervorgehen: trotzdem lassen erwachsene Kinder, die neben ihrer Mutter stehen, die Hypothese als sehr ungereimt erscheinen; sie hat den Augenschein gegen sich.
(Morgenröte, 340)
Appearances are against the Historian. —It is a sufficiently demonstrated fact that human beings come from the womb; nevertheless when children grow up and stand by the side of their mother this hypothesis appears very absurd—all appearances are against it.
[tr.: John McFarland Kennedy]
(Morgenröte, 340)
Appearances are against the Historian. —It is a sufficiently demonstrated fact that human beings come from the womb; nevertheless when children grow up and stand by the side of their mother this hypothesis appears very absurd—all appearances are against it.
[tr.: John McFarland Kennedy]
08.02.202501:43
Der Wohlthätige. — Der Wohlthätige befriedigt ein Bedürfniss seines Gemüths, wenn er wohlthut. Je stärker dieses Bedürfniss ist, um so weniger denkt er sich in den Anderen hinein, der ihm dient, sein Bedürfniss zu stillen, er wird unzart und beleidigt unter Umständen. (Diess sagt man der jüdischen Wohlthätigkeit und Barmherzigkeit nach: welche bekanntlich etwas hitziger ist, als die anderer Völker.)
(Morgenröte, 334)
The Charitable Man. —The charitable man gratifies a need of his own inward feelings when doing good. The stronger this need is the less does such a man try to put himself in the place of those who serve the purpose of gratifying his desire: he becomes indelicate and sometimes even offensive. (This remark applies to the benevolence and charity of the Jews, which, as is well known, is somewhat more effusive than that of other peoples.)
[tr.: John McFarland Kennedy]
(Morgenröte, 334)
The Charitable Man. —The charitable man gratifies a need of his own inward feelings when doing good. The stronger this need is the less does such a man try to put himself in the place of those who serve the purpose of gratifying his desire: he becomes indelicate and sometimes even offensive. (This remark applies to the benevolence and charity of the Jews, which, as is well known, is somewhat more effusive than that of other peoples.)
[tr.: John McFarland Kennedy]
29.07.202401:44
Der Sieg über die Kraft. — Erwägt man, was bisher Alles als „übermenschlicher Geist“, als „Genie“ verehrt worden ist, so kommt man zu dem traurigen Schlusse, dass im Ganzen die Intellectualität der Menschheit doch etwas sehr Niedriges und Armseliges gewesen sein muss: so wenig Geist gehörte bisher dazu, um sich gleich erheblich über sie hinaus zu fühlen! Ach, um den wohlfeilen Ruhm des „Genie’s“! Wie schnell ist sein Thron errichtet, seine Anbetung zum Brauch geworden! Immer noch liegt man vor der Kraft auf den Knieen — nach alter Sclaven-Gewohnheit — und doch ist, wenn der Grad von Verehrungswürdigkeit festgestellt werden soll, nur der Grad der Vernunft in der Kraft entscheidend: man muss messen, inwieweit gerade die Kraft durch etwas Höheres überwunden worden ist und als ihr Werkzeug und Mittel nunmehr in Diensten steht! Aber für ein solches Messen giebt es noch gar zu wenig Augen, ja zumeist wird noch das Messen des Genie’s für einen Frevel gehalten. Und so geht vielleicht das Schönste immer noch im Dunkel vor sich und versinkt, kaum geboren, in ewige Nacht, — nämlich das Schauspiel jener Kraft, welche ein Genie nicht auf Werke, sondern auf sich als Werk, verwendet, das heisst auf seine eigene Bändigung, auf Reinigung seiner Phantasie, auf Ordnung und Auswahl im Zuströmen von Aufgaben und Einfällen. Noch immer ist der grosse Mensch gerade in dem Grössten, was Verehrung erheischt, unsichtbar wie ein zu fernes Gestirn: sein Sieg über die Kraft bleibt ohne Augen und folglich auch ohne Lied und Sänger. Noch immer ist die Rangordnung der Grösse für alle vergangene Menschheit noch nicht festgesetzt.
(Morgenröte, 548)
Victory Over Power. —If we consider all that has been venerated up to the present as “superhuman intellect” or “genius,” we must come to the sad conclusion that, considered as a whole, the intellectuality of mankind must have been extremely low and poor: so little mind has hitherto been necessary in order to feel at once considerably superior to all this! Alas for the cheap glory of “genius” ! How quickly has it been raised to the throne, and its worship grown into a custom! We still fall on our knees before power—according to the old custom of slaves—and nevertheless, when the degree of venerability comes to be determined, only the degree of reason in the power will be the deciding factor. We must find out, indeed, to how great an extent power has been overcome by something higher, which it now obeys as a tool and instrument.
As yet, however, there have been too few eyes for such investigations: even in the majority of cases the mere valuation of genius has almost been looked upon as blasphemy. And thus perhaps everything that is most beautiful still takes place in the midst of darkness and vanishes in endless night almost as soon as it has made its appearance,—I refer to the spectacle of that power which a genius does not lay out upon works, but upon himself as a work, that is, his own self-control, the purifying of his own imagination, the order and selection in his inspirations and tasks. The great man ever remains invisible in the greatest thing that claims worship, like some distant star: his victory over power remains without witnesses, and hence also without songs and singers. The hierarchy of the great men in all the past history of the human race has not yet been determined.
[tr.: John McFarland Kennedy]
(Morgenröte, 548)
Victory Over Power. —If we consider all that has been venerated up to the present as “superhuman intellect” or “genius,” we must come to the sad conclusion that, considered as a whole, the intellectuality of mankind must have been extremely low and poor: so little mind has hitherto been necessary in order to feel at once considerably superior to all this! Alas for the cheap glory of “genius” ! How quickly has it been raised to the throne, and its worship grown into a custom! We still fall on our knees before power—according to the old custom of slaves—and nevertheless, when the degree of venerability comes to be determined, only the degree of reason in the power will be the deciding factor. We must find out, indeed, to how great an extent power has been overcome by something higher, which it now obeys as a tool and instrument.
As yet, however, there have been too few eyes for such investigations: even in the majority of cases the mere valuation of genius has almost been looked upon as blasphemy. And thus perhaps everything that is most beautiful still takes place in the midst of darkness and vanishes in endless night almost as soon as it has made its appearance,—I refer to the spectacle of that power which a genius does not lay out upon works, but upon himself as a work, that is, his own self-control, the purifying of his own imagination, the order and selection in his inspirations and tasks. The great man ever remains invisible in the greatest thing that claims worship, like some distant star: his victory over power remains without witnesses, and hence also without songs and singers. The hierarchy of the great men in all the past history of the human race has not yet been determined.
[tr.: John McFarland Kennedy]
15.02.202501:43
Und als ich bei ihnen wohnte, da wohnte ich über ihnen. Darüber wurden sie mir gram.
Sie wollen Nichts davon hören, dass Einer über ihren Köpfen wandelt; und so legten sie Holz und Erde und Unrath zwischen mich und ihre Köpfe.
Also dämpften sie den Schall meiner Schritte: und am schlechtesten wurde ich bisher von den Gelehrtesten gehört.
Aller Menschen Fehl und Schwäche legten sie zwischen sich und mich: — „Fehlboden“ heissen sie das in ihren Häusern.
Aber trotzdem wandele ich mit meinen Gedanken über ihren Köpfen; und selbst, wenn ich auf meinen eignen Fehlern wandeln wollte, würde ich noch über ihnen sein und ihren Köpfen.
Denn die Menschen sind nicht gleich: so spricht die Gerechtigkeit. Und was ich will, dürften sie nicht wollen!
(Also sprach Zarathustra, „Von den Gelehrten“)
And when I lived with them, then did I live above them. Therefore did they take a dislike to me.
They want to hear nothing of any one walking above their heads; and so they put wood and earth and rubbish betwixt me and their heads.
Thus did they deafen the sound of my tread: and least have I hitherto been heard by the most learned.
All mankind's faults and weaknesses did they put betwixt themselves and me:--they call it "false ceiling" in their houses.
But nevertheless I walk with my thoughts ABOVE their heads; and even should I walk on mine own errors, still would I be above them and their heads.
For men are NOT equal: so speaketh justice. And what I will, THEY may not will!--
[tr.: Thomas Common]
Sie wollen Nichts davon hören, dass Einer über ihren Köpfen wandelt; und so legten sie Holz und Erde und Unrath zwischen mich und ihre Köpfe.
Also dämpften sie den Schall meiner Schritte: und am schlechtesten wurde ich bisher von den Gelehrtesten gehört.
Aller Menschen Fehl und Schwäche legten sie zwischen sich und mich: — „Fehlboden“ heissen sie das in ihren Häusern.
Aber trotzdem wandele ich mit meinen Gedanken über ihren Köpfen; und selbst, wenn ich auf meinen eignen Fehlern wandeln wollte, würde ich noch über ihnen sein und ihren Köpfen.
Denn die Menschen sind nicht gleich: so spricht die Gerechtigkeit. Und was ich will, dürften sie nicht wollen!
(Also sprach Zarathustra, „Von den Gelehrten“)
And when I lived with them, then did I live above them. Therefore did they take a dislike to me.
They want to hear nothing of any one walking above their heads; and so they put wood and earth and rubbish betwixt me and their heads.
Thus did they deafen the sound of my tread: and least have I hitherto been heard by the most learned.
All mankind's faults and weaknesses did they put betwixt themselves and me:--they call it "false ceiling" in their houses.
But nevertheless I walk with my thoughts ABOVE their heads; and even should I walk on mine own errors, still would I be above them and their heads.
For men are NOT equal: so speaketh justice. And what I will, THEY may not will!--
[tr.: Thomas Common]
11.02.202501:42
Verwandlung der Pflichten. — Wenn die Pflicht aufhört, schwer zu fallen, wenn sie sich nach langer Übung zur lustvollen Neigung und zum Bedürfniss umwandelt, dann werden die Rechte Anderer, auf welche sich unsere Pflichten, jetzt unsere Neigungen beziehen, etwas Anderes: nämlich Anlässe zu angenehmen Empfindungen für uns. Der Andere wird vermöge seiner Rechte von da an liebenswürdig (anstatt ehrwürdig und furchtbar, wie vordem). Wir suchen unsere Lust, wenn wir jetzt den Bereich seiner Macht anerkennen und unterhalten. Als die Quietisten keine Last mehr an ihrem Christenthume hatten und in Gott nur ihre Lust fanden, nahmen sie ihren Wahlspruch „Alles zur Ehre Gottes!“ an: was sie auch immer in diesem Sinne thaten, es war kein Opfer mehr; es hiess so viel als „Alles zu unserm Vergnügen!“ Zu verlangen, dass die Pflicht immer etwas lästig falle — wie es Kant thut — heisst verlangen, dass sie niemals Gewohnheit und Sitte werde: in diesem Verlangen steckt ein kleiner Rest von asketischer Grausamkeit.
(Morgenröte, 339)
The Transformation of Duties. —When our duties cease to be difficult of accomplishment, and after long practice become changed into agreeable delights and needs, then the rights of others to whom our duties (though now our inclinations) refer change into something else: that is, they become the occasion of pleasant feelings for us. Henceforth the “other,” by virtue of his rights, becomes an object of love to us instead of an object of reverence and awe as formerly. It is our own pleasure we seek when we recognise and maintain the extent of his power. When the Quietists no longer felt their Christian faith as a burden, and experienced their delight only in God, they took the motto: “Do all to the glory of God.” Whatever they performed henceforth in this sense was no longer a sacrifice, it was as much as to say, “Everything for the sake of our pleasure.” To demand that duty should be always rather burdensome, as Kant does, is to demand that it shall never develop into a habit or custom. There is a small residue of ascetic cruelty in this demand.
[tr.: John McFarland Kennedy]
(Morgenröte, 339)
The Transformation of Duties. —When our duties cease to be difficult of accomplishment, and after long practice become changed into agreeable delights and needs, then the rights of others to whom our duties (though now our inclinations) refer change into something else: that is, they become the occasion of pleasant feelings for us. Henceforth the “other,” by virtue of his rights, becomes an object of love to us instead of an object of reverence and awe as formerly. It is our own pleasure we seek when we recognise and maintain the extent of his power. When the Quietists no longer felt their Christian faith as a burden, and experienced their delight only in God, they took the motto: “Do all to the glory of God.” Whatever they performed henceforth in this sense was no longer a sacrifice, it was as much as to say, “Everything for the sake of our pleasure.” To demand that duty should be always rather burdensome, as Kant does, is to demand that it shall never develop into a habit or custom. There is a small residue of ascetic cruelty in this demand.
[tr.: John McFarland Kennedy]
07.02.202501:43
„Menschlichkeit“. — Wir halten die Thiere nicht für moralische Wesen. Aber meint ihr denn, dass die Thiere uns für moralische Wesen halten? — Ein Thier, welches reden konnte, sagte: „Menschlichkeit ist ein Vorurtheil, an dem wenigstens wir Thiere nicht leiden.“
(Morgenröte, 333)
“Humanity.” —We do not consider animals as moral beings. But do you think that animals consider us as moral beings? An animal which had the power of speech once said: “Humanity is a prejudice from which we animals at least do not suffer.”
[tr.: John McFarland Kennedy]
(Morgenröte, 333)
“Humanity.” —We do not consider animals as moral beings. But do you think that animals consider us as moral beings? An animal which had the power of speech once said: “Humanity is a prejudice from which we animals at least do not suffer.”
[tr.: John McFarland Kennedy]
दिखाया गया 1 - 15 का 15
अधिक कार्यक्षमता अनलॉक करने के लिए लॉगिन करें।