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Телеграмна служба новин - Україна

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Ibn al-Layth
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18.04.202523:59
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Refutation of the Majaz Aqli argument in Istighatha by Shaykh Sultan al-Umayri
07.04.202511:53
Did Imām Aḥmad Really Do Ta’wīl on Allah's Coming? Unpacking the Truth About The Narration.
This is a response to a often used narration of Imam Ahmad seemingly doing tawil on Allah's coming! The article will be a response to the claim from three perspectives, shedding light onto the narration.
This is a response to a often used narration of Imam Ahmad seemingly doing tawil on Allah's coming! The article will be a response to the claim from three perspectives, shedding light onto the narration.
06.04.202513:25
Translation of Shaykh Saleh aal al-Shaykhs speech on Hulul al-A’raad
https://telegra.ph/Hulul-al-Araad-Explained-by-Shaykh-Saleh-aal-al-Shaykh-in-his-Sharh-of-Wasitiyyah-04-06
https://telegra.ph/Hulul-al-Araad-Explained-by-Shaykh-Saleh-aal-al-Shaykh-in-his-Sharh-of-Wasitiyyah-04-06
08.04.202512:02
Did Ibn Taymiyyah deny majāz? Translation of Shaykh Ahmad Issam al-Najjar's article
https://telegra.ph/Did-Ibn-Taymiyyah-deny-maj%C4%81z-Translation-of-Shaykh-Ahmad-Issam-al-Najjars-article-04-08
https://telegra.ph/Did-Ibn-Taymiyyah-deny-maj%C4%81z-Translation-of-Shaykh-Ahmad-Issam-al-Najjars-article-04-08
13.04.202521:42
We say concerning qadr mushtarak 📚✏️:
It is established with certainty that we — as mumkināt (contingent beings) — possess the act of placing things in their proper context and position, and this is what is defined as ḥikmah (wisdom). Now, if it is claimed that:
“Whatever is affirmed for the mumkin is impossible for the wājib al-wujūd (Necessary Being),”
then it would entail that ḥikmah is impossible for Allāh. However, ḥikmah is a ṣifah dhātiyyah inseparable from his dhat, and to affirm its impossibility leads to taʿṭīl, which would entail that the Wājib al-Wujūd Himself becomes muḥāl (impossible) — and we seek refuge in Allāh from such a blasphemous implication. This is clearly muntaniʿ (rationally impossible).
On the other hand, if one were to claim that Allāh is not ḥakīm (wise), then the ʿālam (created world) would necessarily be without niẓām (order), since order is rationally tied to the concept of placing each thing in its proper place. Therefore, the connection between niẓām and ḥikmah is one of dalālah ʿaqliyyah.
Thus, to deny ḥikmah for Allāh would entail the negation of niẓām, which in turn implies either that al-ʿaql (reason) is invalid or that no knowledge (ʿilm) can be acquired — and this is also muntaniʿ.
Therefore, by establishing the buṭlān al-lāzim, we establish the buṭlān al-muqaddimah namely, the claim that
“whatever is affirmed for the mumkin is impossible for the wājib.”
The nafy (negation) of this premise becomes affirmed — meaning that it is wujūbiyyān (necessarily) the case that a qadr mushtarak exists between the ṣifāt of the mumkin and the wājib. To deny this — and we seek refuge with Allāh — is a form of istikhfāf (disrespectful trivialization), specifically a rejection of the ḥikmah of Allāh, which is impermissible for any Muslim to suggest.
What I am attempting here is a taqrīr of the section. There are indeed many detailed treatises on this, but I am presenting a ṣiyāghah ʿāmmah (general formulation) so that anyone can construct the ilzām in their own language.
The method is as follows:
1. Begin with an attribute affirmed for the mumkin (e.g., ʿilm, ḥikmah, qudrah, irādah, wujud, etc.) — attributes that are generally categorized as ṣifāt kamāl (attributes of perfection).
2. Acknowledge that there is a qadr mushtarak between this and the Attribute.
3. Denying the attribute for the wājib leads to taʿṭīl and muḥālāt.
4. Present the claim of the mukhālif (opponent) as: “What is affirmed for the mumkin is impossible for the wājib, and vice versa.”
5. The natījah (consequence) of that would be the negation of one of the ṣifāt al-kamāl from either the mumkin or the wājib, which leads to muḥāl.
6. Since this muḥāl follows from the premise, the premise is invalid.
7. Thus, the negation of that claim is affirmed: there necessarily exists a qadr mushtarak between the ṣifāt of the mumkin and the wājib — not in ḥaqīqah, but in mafhūm or in a certain way.
And Allāh knows best.
— ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Andalusī 📚✏️
It is established with certainty that we — as mumkināt (contingent beings) — possess the act of placing things in their proper context and position, and this is what is defined as ḥikmah (wisdom). Now, if it is claimed that:
“Whatever is affirmed for the mumkin is impossible for the wājib al-wujūd (Necessary Being),”
then it would entail that ḥikmah is impossible for Allāh. However, ḥikmah is a ṣifah dhātiyyah inseparable from his dhat, and to affirm its impossibility leads to taʿṭīl, which would entail that the Wājib al-Wujūd Himself becomes muḥāl (impossible) — and we seek refuge in Allāh from such a blasphemous implication. This is clearly muntaniʿ (rationally impossible).
On the other hand, if one were to claim that Allāh is not ḥakīm (wise), then the ʿālam (created world) would necessarily be without niẓām (order), since order is rationally tied to the concept of placing each thing in its proper place. Therefore, the connection between niẓām and ḥikmah is one of dalālah ʿaqliyyah.
Thus, to deny ḥikmah for Allāh would entail the negation of niẓām, which in turn implies either that al-ʿaql (reason) is invalid or that no knowledge (ʿilm) can be acquired — and this is also muntaniʿ.
Therefore, by establishing the buṭlān al-lāzim, we establish the buṭlān al-muqaddimah namely, the claim that
“whatever is affirmed for the mumkin is impossible for the wājib.”
The nafy (negation) of this premise becomes affirmed — meaning that it is wujūbiyyān (necessarily) the case that a qadr mushtarak exists between the ṣifāt of the mumkin and the wājib. To deny this — and we seek refuge with Allāh — is a form of istikhfāf (disrespectful trivialization), specifically a rejection of the ḥikmah of Allāh, which is impermissible for any Muslim to suggest.
What I am attempting here is a taqrīr of the section. There are indeed many detailed treatises on this, but I am presenting a ṣiyāghah ʿāmmah (general formulation) so that anyone can construct the ilzām in their own language.
The method is as follows:
1. Begin with an attribute affirmed for the mumkin (e.g., ʿilm, ḥikmah, qudrah, irādah, wujud, etc.) — attributes that are generally categorized as ṣifāt kamāl (attributes of perfection).
2. Acknowledge that there is a qadr mushtarak between this and the Attribute.
3. Denying the attribute for the wājib leads to taʿṭīl and muḥālāt.
4. Present the claim of the mukhālif (opponent) as: “What is affirmed for the mumkin is impossible for the wājib, and vice versa.”
5. The natījah (consequence) of that would be the negation of one of the ṣifāt al-kamāl from either the mumkin or the wājib, which leads to muḥāl.
6. Since this muḥāl follows from the premise, the premise is invalid.
7. Thus, the negation of that claim is affirmed: there necessarily exists a qadr mushtarak between the ṣifāt of the mumkin and the wājib — not in ḥaqīqah, but in mafhūm or in a certain way.
And Allāh knows best.
— ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Andalusī 📚✏️


13.04.202521:37
نقول في القدر المشترك 📚✏️:
انه ثبت في حقنا اننا نضع الشيء في موضعه ومحله وهذه هي الحكمة فإن قيل انا ما ثبت للممكن امتنع في حق الواجب امتنع في حق الواجب الحكمة وهذ صفو ذاتية لا تنفك عن ذاته عز وجل وبكونها محالة يصبح الباري و الواجب محال و العياذ بالله وهذا ممتنع ومن جهة أخرى ان قيل ان الله ليس حكيم اصبح العالم غير منظم وذلك بإعتبار النظام كون الشيء في موضعه فالدلالة بين النظام و الحكمة دلالة عقلية اي القول ان الله ليس حكيم يلزم عنه ذلك ان العالم غير منظم اب العقل غير متقن بالتالي تسد بل المعرفة وتحصيل العلم وهذا ممتنع وبإعتبار بطلان التالي يبطل المقدم وهو ان ما تبث للممكن امتنع في حق الواجب بالتالي سلب القضية هو الواجب اي انه وجوبا هناك قدر مشترك وهذا والعياذ بالله تهاون منا (اي بيان امتناع الطعن في حكمة الله للمسلم)
هذا الذي اقوم به خلف في الباب هناك تقارير كثيرة لكن سوف اضع صياغة عام ليستطيع اي كان ان يصوغ الازام بشكله الخاص أولا نأخد صفة تابثا لنا نحن الممكن وهناك قدر مشترك بينها وبين صفو للباري (مثال الحكمة العلم الوجود الحياة الفعل القدرة الارادة غالبا ما تكون كمالا) كذلك ونفيها يوقع في محال ثم تطرح قول المخالف في مقدمة وقول المخالف هو انا ما ثبت للممكن امتنع في الواجب و العكس صحيح و النتيجه انه ستمتنع في احدهما صفة تابث له كما طرحنا سابقاً (الوجود العلم القدرة.....) اي يلزم محال فيبطل المقدم و بالضبط القول ان ما تبث لاحدهما امتنع في حق الآخر لانه المقدمة الأخرى (وهي اتصاف الباري بالصفة و الممكن بصفة بينهما قدر مشترك امر تابث لا يرد)
انتهى
عبد الرحمان الأندلسي 📚✏️
انه ثبت في حقنا اننا نضع الشيء في موضعه ومحله وهذه هي الحكمة فإن قيل انا ما ثبت للممكن امتنع في حق الواجب امتنع في حق الواجب الحكمة وهذ صفو ذاتية لا تنفك عن ذاته عز وجل وبكونها محالة يصبح الباري و الواجب محال و العياذ بالله وهذا ممتنع ومن جهة أخرى ان قيل ان الله ليس حكيم اصبح العالم غير منظم وذلك بإعتبار النظام كون الشيء في موضعه فالدلالة بين النظام و الحكمة دلالة عقلية اي القول ان الله ليس حكيم يلزم عنه ذلك ان العالم غير منظم اب العقل غير متقن بالتالي تسد بل المعرفة وتحصيل العلم وهذا ممتنع وبإعتبار بطلان التالي يبطل المقدم وهو ان ما تبث للممكن امتنع في حق الواجب بالتالي سلب القضية هو الواجب اي انه وجوبا هناك قدر مشترك وهذا والعياذ بالله تهاون منا (اي بيان امتناع الطعن في حكمة الله للمسلم)
هذا الذي اقوم به خلف في الباب هناك تقارير كثيرة لكن سوف اضع صياغة عام ليستطيع اي كان ان يصوغ الازام بشكله الخاص أولا نأخد صفة تابثا لنا نحن الممكن وهناك قدر مشترك بينها وبين صفو للباري (مثال الحكمة العلم الوجود الحياة الفعل القدرة الارادة غالبا ما تكون كمالا) كذلك ونفيها يوقع في محال ثم تطرح قول المخالف في مقدمة وقول المخالف هو انا ما ثبت للممكن امتنع في الواجب و العكس صحيح و النتيجه انه ستمتنع في احدهما صفة تابث له كما طرحنا سابقاً (الوجود العلم القدرة.....) اي يلزم محال فيبطل المقدم و بالضبط القول ان ما تبث لاحدهما امتنع في حق الآخر لانه المقدمة الأخرى (وهي اتصاف الباري بالصفة و الممكن بصفة بينهما قدر مشترك امر تابث لا يرد)
انتهى
عبد الرحمان الأندلسي 📚✏️


17.04.202514:32
17.04.202514:32
Clarification on al-Tahsin wal-Taqbih
Ibn Taymiyyah said:
Ibn Taymiyyah said:
In summary: when Allah, the Exalted, commands something, then it is good (ḥasan) by agreement, and when He prohibits something, then it is evil (qabīḥ) by agreement. However, the question arises—what is the source of the goodness or evil of an act? Is it:
1. That the act itself inherently possesses goodness or evil, and the command or prohibition is merely an indicator (kāshif) of that;
2. Or that the act becomes good or evil solely due to the divine command or prohibition;
3. Or that it is a combination of both
The first view is the position of the Muʿtazilah. This is why they do not permit the abrogation (naskh) of a command before its time of implementation has arrived—because to them, this would entail that a single act can simultaneously be good and evil, which is contradictory. This view was also held by Abū al-Ḥasan al-Tamīmī from the Ḥanbalī Madhab and others from among the Fuqaha.
The second view is that of the Ashʿarīs and those who follow them, such as the Dhahiris and some Fuqaha across various Madahib. These scholars hold that the causes (‘ilal) given in the Sharīʿah are merely signs (amārāt) and not intrinsic explanations. They deny the existence of a rational correlation (munāsabah) between causes and their rulings. However, these same Fuqaha often contradict this stance in their Fiqh. They sometimes align with the Ashʿarī Mutakallimeen, but in many scenarios, especially in the works of Mālikī, Shāfiʿī, and Ḥanbalī Fuqaha, they adopt positions that imply the opposite.
The third position is that the goodness or evil arises from both the act itself and the divine command or prohibition. This is the view of the leading Imams (aʾimmah) and is the practical stance adopted by the Fuqaha in their application of the Sharīʿah. For instance, sometimes a command is issued due to a wisdom found in the command itself rather than in the commanded act—this allows for such commands to be abrogated before full implementation. Examples include the reduction of the fifty prayers on the night of Miʿrāj to five, or the abrogation of the command to Ibrāhīm (peace be upon him) to sacrifice his son.”
Sharḥ al-Aṣbahāniyyah
06.04.202513:25
06.04.202513:24
05.04.202516:31
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