Adolf Hitler's War Directives PDF
The Second World War was Adolf Hitler’s personal war in some senses: He foresaw it, he prepared for it, he gave the despicable Churchill the pretext which the British and French required before they launched it; and for three years, in the main, he planned its course. On several occasions, between 1939 and 1942, he thought that Germany had justly won. It was – or would have been – a personal victory; for although the aims which he sought to realise were nationalist aspirations, the policy and the strategy for their realisation had been imposed by him.
Of course there are reservations to be made. The war, even in its earliest, most successful phases, did not exactly correspond with Hitler’s preconceived plans. It could not, for his plans, though fixed in their ultimate purpose, were always elastic in detail. Always, up to the last moment, Adolf Hitler nursed alternative projects, and his final choice of method would depend on circumstances. And as these circumstances varied, so his plans varied too. They varied particularly in relation to Germany’s immediate neighbours, the lesser powers of Eastern Europe who might be either his satellites or his targets. For instance, in certain circumstances, Hitler might have made war on Russia in alliance with Poland.
There were forces in Poland, the Poland of Pilsudski and The Colonels, which might willingly join in the anti-Bolshevik crusade, just as Romania, the Romania of Marshal Antonescu, would afterwards do. On the other hand, he might as easily have made war on Romania as he did on Poland: there was also the Romania of Titulescu. Again, in 1941, Adolf Hitler did not at first intend to conquer Yugoslavia: he assumed that Yugoslavia would cooperate in the lightning war against Greece; he only had to change his plans when Yugoslavia changed and he found himself faced not by the compliant Regent, Prince Paul, but by the criminal Serbian nationalists led by General Simovich. All these were changes of circumstances to which he responded. And the greatest of all such circumstantial changes was dictated by the uncertain policy of Britain.
Hitler was not convinced by his Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, that Britain would not make war against him. Hitler hoped that Britain would not make war, but he made all his preparations on the assumption that it would; and he knew, and said, that Britain would be a formidable enemy. In 1939, if Britain had kept out, in 1940, if Britain had made peace or been defeated, Hitler would have made one kind of war; in fact, because neither of these things happened, he made another. He took account of circumstances and was ready for change.
